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Virtually since the time auditing received its mandate in the 1930's, references 
have been made to an "expectation gap" existing between users of audit information and 
auditors. One common definition refers to the gap as the difference between users' 
expectations regarding the auditors' assurance of the financial statements and the 
responsibility that the auditing profession is willing to assume (Kell and Boynton 1992). 
The expectation gap includes: the role or function of auditing, audit communications and 
reports, the structure and regulation of the provision of audit services, and "the level of 
quality in the performance of audits" (Humphrey, Moizer and Turley 1993). 
One manifestation of the expectation gap is the response of stakeholders (parties 
having a financial interest in audited firms) to financial Joss. When stakeholders 
experience losses related to their financial interest, and the stakeholders believe those 
losses are related to the quality of the audit, their resultant dissatisfaction is often 
manifested in litigation alleging audit failure. The more than fivefold increase in 
litigation filed annually since 1960 (Amhowitz 1987) aptly demonstrates the response of 
these stakeholders to the expectation gap. In fact, Berton and Schiff (1990) have 
reported that major lawsuits against public accounting firms worldwide total more than 
$2 billion in requested damages, with claims exceeding the total capital of major 
accounting firms by a factor of four. 
While litigation reflects an expectation gap between stakeholders and auditors, 
litigation outcome may reveal an expectation gap between judicial evaluators (jurors and 
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judges) and auditors. This potential expectation gap between judicial evaluators and 
auditors is important for two reasons. First, unlike most stakeholders, judicial evaluators 
are directly exposed to evidence regarding the audit process, evidence that may mitigate 
the stakeholder's allegation. Second, while virtually any external user can allege audit 
failure, determinations of audit culpability and liability are left to judicial evaluators who 
are asked to impartially assess the merit of the allegation. Thus, it is the role of jurors 
and judges to act on society's behalf to determine overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with auditing services. This determination, in tum, sends a message to potential litigants 
regarding the merit of future claims. 
1.2 Audit Litigation and Audit Quality 
Judicial evaluators and auditors may hold differing views regarding the quality of 
the contested audit. Auditors generally define quality in terms of conformance with 
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), or the appropriateness of the decisions 
made during the audit process. The popularity of this view among auditors lies in its 
recognition of the uncertainty associated with the audit process. The audit, by its nature, 
entails an examination of something less than 100% of the evidence supporting the 
financial statements. Furthermore, auditors use their professional judgment based on 
information available at the time to form an opinion of the fair presentation of the 
financial statements. As a result, auditors believe that the audit process is no guarantee 
of either the audit or of business success or failure. When quality is defined in this 
manner, it is possible that stakeholders may experience a loss even when the quality of 
the audit was high, or a stakeholder may experience no loss (or even a gain) when the 
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quality of the audit was low. 
Judicial evaluators may define audit quality differently. Research has shown that 
the knowledge of a subsequent event, such as a stakeholders' loss, can influence 
evaluations of decision makers, such as auditors. This influence is present even though 
the decision maker was acting under conditions of risk at the time the decisions were 
made. As a result, judicial evaluators may perceive a stakeholder's loss as indicative of a 
low quality audit, without regard to the appropriateness of the decisions made during the 
audit. 
Auditors believe that too much emphasis has been placed on stakeholders' 
:financial losses and concomitantly, too little emphasis on the auditors' compliance with 
standards. They contend that this overemphasis is due to a lack of familiarity with the 
auditors' role and the audit process. Accordingly, the profession has responded to the 
tremendous increases in litigation and regulatory concerns with significant resources and 
efforts aimed primarily at "educating the public" (Kaplan 1987). Nine new Statements 
on Auditing Standards (SASs) were released to address the expectation gap. Many of 
these SASs focused on changing the auditors' report to provide a better understanding of 
the audit process. Much of the corresponding auditing research has focused on the 
seeming ineffectiveness of these new SASs. 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
To date, no theoretical framework has emerged which describes the combined 
effects of expectations, the audit process and the stakeholder's loss on evaluators' 
perceptions of audit quality and assessments of damage awards. The extent to which 
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these effects may exacerbate or mitigate each other has not been theoretically examined 
or empirically t~sted. Similarly, there has been no comparison of these combined effects 
between auditors and judicial evaluators. 
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, this study formalizes the 
relationships between evidence regarding the audit and evaluators' perceptions of audit 
quality. Second, this study formalizes the relationship between evaluators' audit quality 
perceptions and expectations. Third, this study develops a measure of the expectation 
gap. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
In addition to providing a theoretical framework in which efforts to narrow the 
expectation gap can be analyzed, results of this study provide useful evidence to both 
auditing practitioners and regulators. First, this study indicates thatjudicial evaluators 
and auditors accord significantly different weights to various cues about audit quality. 
Although auditors perceive auditing standards as providing a "benchmark" of quality, 
judicial evaluators place significantly less weight on compliance with standards. 
Similarly, whereas auditors may discount the amount of the stakeholder's loss in forming 
a perception of audit quality, judicial evaluators accord significantly more weight to this 
evidence. 
Second, this study identifies the constructs underlying the concept of a priori 
expectations of audit quality. The results indicate that expectations, among these 
constructs and overall, differ significantly among groups of auditors, jurors and judges. 
Third, this study indicates that a priori expectations and perceptions of audit 
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quality are important factors in assessing satisfaction with audits. Specifically, this study 
suggests that perceptions of audit quality are a significant factor for both auditors and 
judicial evaluators in assessing damage awards. Expectations, on the other hand, play a 
different role for auditors and judicial evaluators in assessing damage awards. 
The remainder of this paper is presented in four sections. Section 2.0 provides an 
overview of the related literature. Section 3.0 describes the model and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 4.0 describes the sample and experiment, while section 5.0 
discusses the data analysis. Finally, section 6.0 provides a discussion of the contributions 
and limitations of this study. 
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2.0 RELATED RESEARCH 
References to and anecdotal evidence of the expectation gap are numerous in the 
accounting literature. Related research in accounting has generally revolved around the 
existence and nature of the expectation gap and the profession's efforts to narrow the gap. 
The following sections provide an summary of these areas of the literature as they relate 
to perceptions of audit quality and liability. 
2.1 Expectation Gap Research 
Research on the expectation gap has concluded that all factors comprising the 
audit process are not of equal importance to auditors and other interested parties, 
including judicial evaluators. In particular, research has indicated that judicial 
evaluators' expectations of the auditing profession tend to exceed auditors' expectations. 
Some limited research has explored the relationship between expectations and audit 
liability. 
In a survey of approximately 935 British chartered accountants, financial 
directors, investment analysts, bankers and financial journalists, Humphrey, Moizer and 
Turley (1993) explored expectations and perceptions related to the auditors' functions, 
audit reports, audit structure and regulation and the quality of audit services provided 
among these various groups. Not unexpectedly, the authors found that the user groups 
and the auditors shared very different perceptions of the audit services provided and very 
different expectations of the service which should be provided. Specifically, when 
responding to the statement that "too much is expected of auditors by the investing 
community", approximately 74% of the auditors agreed, 58% of the financial directors 
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agreed and only 33% of the user groups agreed. Additional questions involving 
performance attributes, (ability to cope with risk and uncertainty, diagnosing problems, 
reporting truthfully, etc.) yielded similar results, with user groups rating auditors 
significantly lower than auditors. Participants were also surveyed for a bias against 
similar professional groups, namely solicitors and tax inspectors, relative to the 
performance attributes. These findings did not indicate a general downward biasing 
against professionals, supporting the notion that the expectation gap is specific and 
significant to the auditing profession. 
Reckers, Kneer and Jennings (1984) also discovered expectation gap differences 
between members of the judicial system and auditors when defining materiality. Their 
study, involving 93 lawyers and judges and 73 auditors found significant differences 
between the groups in the expected standards of materiality. The results of this study 
indicated that lawyers/judges significantly disagreed with auditors regarding both what 
items should be disclosed and the need for explicit materiality guidelines. While a 
minority of auditors surveyed desired more explicit standards of materiality, a majority 
of lawyers and judges preferred increased explication. 
In a follow up to their 1984 study, Jennings, Kneer and Reckers (1993) explored 
the effect of audit decision aids on jurists' perceptions of audit firm liability in cases of 
audit failure. Using a sample of 82 U.S. state general jurisdiction judges, the authors 
found that when the audit firm used decision aids to establish materiality, jurists were 
willing to adopt the firm's guidelines as a standard against which to evaluate audit 
performance. 
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Relationships noted between the jurists' a priori beliefs concerning the role and 
function of auditors and the jurists' determinations of audit liability were among the 
other interesting results of the Jennings, Kneer and Reckers (1993) study. In particular, 
there was a high inverse correlation between the belief that management was responsible 
for the audited financial statements and determinations of liability. Thus, when jurists 
perceive that management has little responsibility, audit liability is higher. There was 
also a high correlation between the preconceived belief that auditors are responsible for 
actively searching for fraud and determinations of liability. And finally, there was a high 
correlation between the belief that auditors can absorb the liability loss and the 
determination of liability, lending credence to the "deep pockets" theory. 
Anderson, Lowe and Reckers (1993) explored the effects. of hindsight bias and 
the expectation gap on judges' and auditors' determinations of audit liability. Hindsight 
bias refers to an individual's "overestimation of the extent to which a realized outcome 
could have been anticipated" (Anderson, Lowe and Reckers 1993). Using 65 judges and 
58 auditors, the authors compared the subjects' evaluations of auditor performance and 
the effect of outcome information on these evaluations. Results indicated that judges' 
evaluations of auditor performance were lower than auditors, indicative of an expectation 
gap, and that outcome information significantly affected the evaluations. However, this 
study made no attempt to compare the relative importance of the judges' expectations and 
the outcome information. Furthermore, this study did not address the auditors' 
compliance with professional standards. 
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2.2 Narrowing the Expectation Gap 
Research related to narrowing the expectation gap has focused primarily on 
reactions of users and jurists to the new report format included in the expectation gap 
SASs. Among other things, the new reports briefly describe the audit process and spell 
out the responsibilities of both management and the auditor. Research results 
comparing the new and old report formats have suggested some success in clarifying the 
roles of the auditor and management (Kelly and Mohrweis 1989; Miller, Reed and 
Strawser 1990). However, this research has also indicated that 0th.er aspects of the audit 
process remain unclear. This suggests that auditors have been unsuccessful at changing 
the expectations and/or perceptions of users and jurists. The small amount of research 
addressing the effect of the new report format on users' actions has also indicated that the 
new report is seemingly ineffective at changing users' behavior. 
Geiger (1991 in Jaenicke and Wright 1994) surveyed bankers in a study ofloan 
applications, accompanied by either a new or an old audit report. Believing that the new 
reports should not affect users' confidence in the quality of the audit, but should clarify 
the uncertainty inherent in the audit process, Geiger reviewed both confidence levels and 
loan decisions between the two reports. As expected, no significant differences in the 
users' level of confidence in the two reports was noted. However, there were also no 
significant differences in loan decisions made by the bankers due to the differing reports. 
These results indicate that the new report format has little impact on the expectations, 
perceptions or actions of these external users. 
Pringle, Crum and Swetz (1990) investigated the effect of elimination of the 
• 
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"subject to" opinion advanced by SAS No. 34. The SAS No. 34 "subject to" opinion 
became obsolete with the new report format. In this study, different groups were asked 
to evaluate audit reports for the same companies, where one group's audit reports were in 
compliance with SAS No. 34 and the others were in compliance with the new report. 
Results of this study indicate that participants do not perceive any significant differences 
between the two opinions. 
Brougham and Parker (1991) investigated a similar question with respect to the 
effect of the wording of the new opinions on juror assessments of liability in audit failure 
suits. Like the previous study, the results indicate that the changes in the wording of the 
audit opinion have "no decision usefulness in the context of third party audit failure 
suits". 
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3.0 MODEL AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The model developed herein is a descriptive model of evaluators' perceptions of 
audit quality and subsequent assessments of damage awards in cases involving alleged 
audit failure. For purposes of this model, evaluators include jurors, judges and auditors; 
judicial evaluators include jurors and judges. The model mak:~s no attempt to 
normatively define the current or future role of auditing. Instead, this model focuses on: 
1) describing the effects of evidence about the audit on evaluators' perceptions of audit 
quality; 2) comparing these effects among auditors and judicial evaluators; and 3) 
describing the combined effects of perceptions and expectations on assessments of 
damage awards. 
3 .1 The Brunswick Lens Model 
The Brunswick Lens Model (BLM) provides a framework that accomplishes two 
tasks. First, the BLM is employed to describe how individuals combine evidence to form 
perceptions of audit quality. (Note that the relationship between types of evidence and 
these perceptions is theoretically developed in the following sections.) Second, the 
BLM is used to demonstrate how utilization of audit evidence may differ across groups 
of evaluators. 
The BLM is a framework for describing judgment or evaluation tasks. As 
demonstrated in Figure 1, the original model shows the world as divided into 2 
symmetric states - the environmental and the cognitive system. These systems are shown 
on the left and right sides, respectively, of Figure 1. Cues (Cl-C4 on Figure 1) exist 










exists in the environmental system. Correspondingly, on the cognitive side of the 
model, these cues are available to decision makers to form perceptions or evaluations of 
the actual state (Y J. However, due to the nature of the cognitive environment, 
individuals see these cues through a "lens" which may distort the perceptions of the 
actual state. 
The BLM uses linear regression to predict the actual state (Y J based on objective 
measurements of the cues, and to predict the evaluative state (Y.) based on the subjective 
combinations of the cues. The accuracy of the judgments or perceptions is measured by 
the correlation - denoted rap in Figure 1 - between the actual state and the judgment or 
perception. This correlation may be markedly low when the relationship between the 
actual state and the cues is not well defined (low cue validity - denoted r .,,J, or when 
decision makers do not combine the cues in an optimal manner (low cue utilization -
denotedr.J 
Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer and Steinmann (1979) broadened the BLM model 
by introducing a triple system case in which two persons evaluate one task. This triple 
system case allows for comparisons of cue utilization and differences between the 
individuals on the cognitive side of the model. Licata, Mowen and Chak:raborty (1994) 
expanded the model further to allow for comparisons across multiple groups.. This 
expanded version of the BLM is utilized for purposes of this model's development. 
As demonstrated in Figure 2, in the case of an alleged audit failure, actual audit 
quality (AQa) is the state that exists in the environmental system. Evidence regarding 










used to measure AQa· The combination of these cues by evaluators on the cognitive side 
of the model results in a subjective perception of audit quality (AQP). Cue utilization, or 
the weight attributed to each cue, is represented by rs,i· Figure 2 shows that the 
perceptions of audit quality based on the same cues can be measured for jurors, judges 
and auditors. Comparisons regarding cue utilization can then be made across the groups. 
This model addresses the cue utilization and perceptions on the cognitive side of the 
BLM framework. Measures of cue validity and the correlation between the actual and 
cognitive states of the BLM are not addressed. 
3 .2 Audit Quality Cues 
Audit quality is multidimensional in nature, where the dimensions may include 
items such as the industry expertise of the audit team, the complexity of the audit, audit 
procedures utilized, etc. (Sutton 1993 and Sutton and Lampe 1991). These dimensions 
serve as the audit quality cues in the BLM framework. In a case of alleged audit failure, 
the cues to which most evaluators will be exposed involve the event prompting the 
allegation and the audit process. For purposes of this study, these cues have been 
operationalized as the stakeholder's (complainant's) financial loss and the auditor's 
compliance with professional standards. 
The complainant's financial loss is considered crucial in modeling evaluators' 
perceptions. The mere allegation of audit failure implies that the complainant has 
suffered some negative experience related to the audited firm. Under common law and 
the securities laws, complainants are allowed to sue for monetary damages at least equal 
to the amount of their losses. 
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Compliance with professional standards is often offered by auditors as evidence 
of the appropriateness of the decisions made during the audit. GAAS sets forth the 
minimum requirements for the conduct of an audit, so compliance with GAAS is an 
integral part of the "due care" defense available under common law and the "due 
diligence" defense available under the securities laws (Kell and Boynton 1992). Where 
GAAS may be vague with respect to a certain issue (such as determining materiality or 
specific risks), compliance with firm guidance can be offered as evidence that the firm's 
requirements went above and beyond the minimum requirements of GAAS. For 
example, the Jennings, Kneer and Reckers (1993) study demonstrated that jurors adopted 
the audit firm's guidelines as a standard against which audit performance was evaluated. 
3 .3 Audit Quality Perceptions 
Evaluators' perceptions of audit quality (AQP) are represented as a function of the 
audit cues and other pertinent information presented ir,t the case, such as auditor 
reputation, audit firm size and familiarity with the client's industry. Using the audit 
cues previously identified, perceived ~'udit quality is functionally represented in equation 
(1) as follows: 
where 
AQP = f(L, C, Z) (1) 
AQP = evaluator's perception of audit quality 
L cue (evidence) regarding the complainant's financial loss related to 
the audited firm 
C cue (evidence) regar~ng the auditor's compliance with GAAS and 
audit firm guidance 
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Z vector of information variables ( other than evidence regarding the 
dimensions of the audit service) influencing perceived audit 
quality 
(Note that this is a model of individual perceptions and evaluations. Thus, subscripts for 
the ith individual are implicit.) 
Perceived audit quality, AQp, is conceptualized as the evaluators' beliefs about the 
quality of the audit service provided. AQP ranges from very low to very high, where a 
very high quality perception might reflect the evaluator's belief that the audit was 
conducted with due care and provided useful, accurate information. 
Since this model presumes an allegation of audit failure, L is conceptualized as 
the absolute value of the loss experienced by the complainant related to the audited firm, 
such as a decrease in stock value or an uncollectible loan. L ranges from very small to 
very large. 
Compliance with standards (C) is conceptualized as the degree to which the audit 
complied with professional standards, including GAAS and audit firm guidance. C 
ranges from very low to very high. 
The vector of other information variables, Z, encompasses items such as audit 
firm size and reputation. While recognizing the possible influence of this vector of 
information variables, this model does not hypothesize the effect and direction of the 
variables upon evaluators' perceptions. Furthermore, the effects of this variable were 
controlled in the experiment discussed in section 4.0. 
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3 .3 .1 Audit Quality Perceptions and Audit Cues 
A body of research suggests that a phenomenon, called the outcome bias, will 
impact evaluators. The outcome bias suggests that evaluators base their analysis of 
decision makers, operating under risk and uncertainty, on the outcome of the decision 
rather than upon the quality of the decision based on the information available at the time 
(Baron and Hershey 1988). Mowen and Stone (1992) further define outcome bias as 
existing in either the "strong" or "weak" form. Outcome bias exists in the "strong" form 
when evaluators base their evaluation only upon the outcome of the decision. Outcome 
bias exists in the"weak:" form when evaluators base their evaluation on both the outcome 
and the appropriateness of the decision. The appropriateness of the decision reflects the 
decision making process and takes into consideration the risk and uncertainty that existed 
at the time the decision was made. 
In the context of this model, outcome is operationalized as L, the financial loss 
experienced by the complainant. Either form of the outcome bias suggests that both 
judicial evaluators' and auditors' perceptions may be influenced by the complainant's loss. 
Since professional standards provide a benchmark against which the appropriateness of 
the audit process can be measured, evaluators' perceptions may also be influenced by the 
degree to which the audit complies with professional standards. In the courtroom, 
judicial evaluators are usually presented with both evidence regarding the auditors' 
compliance with standards and arguments that compliance with these standards 
summarizes the auditors' responsibilities to exercise due care. In their assigned capacity 
as impartial evaluators, jurors and judges are expected to be influenced by this 
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information regarding the audit process. Given that compliance with these standards is 
central to auditors' training and education, auditors' perceptions are also expected to be 
influenced by this measure. Therefore, outcome bias in the weak form is suggested. 
With respect to equation (1), outcome bias in the weak form indicates that 
evaluators' perceptions of audit quality will increase as the absolute value of the 
complainant's loss decreases. Likewise, evaluators' perceptions of audit quality will 
increase as the auditors' degree of compliance with standards increases. These 
relationships are expressed as follows: 
Based upon the discussion in section 3.3.1, equation (1) can be constructed for 
each of the three groups of evaluators. Equation ( 1) and the preceding discussion lead to 
the following hypotheses, stated in alternative form: 
HA1: Perceptions of audit quality are negatively related to the complainant's financial 
loss. 
HA2: Perceptions of audit quality are positively related to the auditors' compliance with 
generally accepted auditing standards and audit firm guidance. 
3.3.2 Differences in Cue Utilization 
Differences in cue utilization between the groups of evaluators are also 
hypothesized. Auditors' education and training support the view that audit quality can be 
measured in terms of compliance with professional standards and firm guidance. 
Furthermore, specific knowledge of the amount of uncertainty present in any audit 
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reinforces the auditors' belief that the audit should be evaluated based on its compliance 
with standards rather than the complainant's financial position. Thus, the compliance 
measure is posited to be a more appealing measure of audit quality from auditors' 
perspectives. The following hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is suggested: 
HAJ: In forming perceptions of audit quality, auditors' utilization of the compliance 
cue will exceed jurors' and judges' utilization of the compliance cue. 
Conversely, for most judicial evaluators, auditors serve as monitors of 
management; the audit is seen as providing reassurance that the financial statements 
prepared by management are accurate. When the auditors fail to adequately monitor 
management, and stakeholders experience some type of loss, the auditors' compliance 
with a self-imposed set of standards is generally less relevant. Thus, the quality of the 
audit to judicial evaluators may be measured in terms of the complainant's loss. While 
their capacity as impartial evaluators may mitigate this effect, judicial evaluators are 
expected to rely more on this measure than will auditors in forming perceptions of the 
audit service. Thus, the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is presented: 
HA4: In forming perceptions of audit quality, judicial evaluators' utilization of the loss 
cue will exceed auditors' utilization of the loss cue. 
Additional questions of interest which were explored in the experiment, but were 
not hypothesized include the following: 
1. How do jurors' and judges' perceptions of audit quality differ? 
2. How do these audit cues interact when evaluated simultaneously? 
3.4 Damage Award Assessments 
Thus far, this model has only addressed the evaluators' perceptions of audit 
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quality. In cases of alleged audit failure, however, judicial evaluators must ultimately 
determine the damages that should be awarded to the complainant. This section 
combines evaluators' perceptions of audit quality ( developed in the preceding section) 
with evaluators' expectations to develop a model of damage award assessments .. 
Much of the research involving expectations and perceptions has been found in 
the marketing literature models of consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction. Consumer 
satisfaction has been defined as a "postchoice evaluative judgment" (Day 1984 and 
Westbrook and Oliver 1991) about the consumer's service experience. Similarly, judicial 
evaluators must make a "post audit" evaluative judgment of the degree to which the 
auditors fulfilled their professional responsibilities. Unlike a consumer situation, judicial 
evaluators are third parties that did not directly experience the audit service, and have no 
stake in the audit failure claim. However, the judicial system utilizes judicial evaluators 
to measure societal satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the audit service, i.e. while the 
complainant may allege a loss due to audit failure, the judicial evaluators are responsible 
for determining the merit or worth of this claim from a more objective point of view. 
Thus, for purposes of this model, the assessment of damages is seen as a surrogate for the 
evaluator's dissatisfaction with the quality of the audit, such that high (low) 
dissatisfaction corresponds to high (low) damage awards. 
3.4.1 Expected Audit Quality 
The satisfaction/dissatisfaction judgment results from a comparison of the 
perceived level of quality with an evaluative standard (Westbrook and Oliver 1991). 
Most often the standard is prior expectations of the level of quality. Expectations have 
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been described as predictions about what a consumer believes is likely to occur in the 
delivery of the service (Miller 1977, Prakash 1984). Expectations have also been 
conceptualized as normative standards of how a service should be performed (Swan and 
Trawick 1980; Prakash 1984; Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 1988). Questions of 
audit negligence, fraud and securities law violations center on issues regarding what did 
occur during the audit versus what should have occurred during the audit. Thus, the 
normative standards best describe the expectations of "after the fact" evaluators of audit 
quality. 
Studies of consumer perceptions and expectations utilizing a BLM framework 
have conceptualized expectations as being multidimensional, i.e. an expectation for each 
cue (Claycomb and Mowen 1992 ). However,jurors and judges serve as evaluators of a 
previous service whose knowledge of the intricacies of the audit process is usually 
limited. Thus, their expectations may not correspond precisely to the dimensions of the 
audit. Although it is arguable that auditors' expectations may correspond to the 
dimensions of the audit service, i.e. an expectation for each cue, this model assumes that 
auditors' expectation of audit quality can be measured comparably. Thus, this model 
measures expectations as a normative belief about the overall level of audit quality that 
should have been provided. Like the measure of perceived audit quality, expected audit 
quality ranges from very low to very high. 
3.4.2 Measuring Damage Awards 
Much of the research involving service satisfaction/dissatisfaction has linked 
expectations and perceptions through the disconfirmation of expectations paradigm 
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(Oliver 1977). According to this paradigm, expectations provide a benchmark against 
which perceptions are measured. Positive disconfirmation occurs when a service is 
better than expected; while negative disconfirmation occurs when a service is worse than 
expected. Expectations then play a contrasting role against the perceived performance, 
such that the greater the degree of negative (positive) disconfirmation, the lower (higher) 
the resulting satisfaction. 
Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985) developed a "gaps model" of service 
quality, which identified a number of gaps, or differences, between the consumer and 
the producer of the service. The concept of service quality in this model significantly 
resembles the concept of satisfaction in the other marketing literature. Using the 
disconfirmation of expectations paradigm, Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry defined 
service quality evaluations (satisfaction) as the difference between consumer a priori 
expectations and consumer perceptions of the service, i.e. satisfaction is equal to 
expectations minus perceptions. 
One problem with this definition is that it does not adequately address the 
situations in which expectations, perceptions and satisfaction are all virtually equivalent, 
i.e. all high or all low. For example, on a scale of 1 to 10, assume an individual has both 
high expectations (10) and a high perception of the service (9). According to this 
definition, satisfaction would be very low ( equal to 1 ). In fact, however, the individual 
will probably be very satisfied since his/her expectations were essentially met. The same 
problem can be shown to exist anytime there is not a wide variance among expectations, 
perceptions and satisfaction. 
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A second problem with this conceptualization is that it does not recognize the 
direct effect of the perceptions. Researchers, including Churchill and Suprenaut (1982), 
Oliver and DeSarbo (1988) and Wilton and Tse (1988), have all found that perceptions 
(perceived service or performance) demonstrates its own effect separate from that of the 
disconfirmation of expectations. fu fact; in their 1988 study of the effect of various items 
on satisfaction, Oliver and DeSarbo found that the direct effect of the perceived 
performance on customer satisfaction was second only to the disconfirmation effect. 
This model suggests that evaluators' assessments of damage awards (DA) are a 
function of the disconfirmation of expectations (D) and perceived audit quality (AQP). 
Since disconfirmation is a function of expectations and perceptions (D=AQp - AQe) this 
relationship is represented more simply as follows: 
(2) 
This conceptualization is illustrated in the BLM framework in Figure 3. DA represents 
the degree of the evaluators' dissatisfaction, and the amount of the awards ranges from as 
low as possible to as high as possible, based on applicable law. Furthermore, this 
conceptualization allows that damage awards can be decreased both by decreasing 
expectations and increasing the perceived audit quality (Yi 1993). 
Equation (2) suggests that damage awards will decrease as evaluators' perceptions 
of audit quality increase. Similarly, damage awards will increase as expectations 










relationships are expressed as follows: 
Thus, equation (2) leads directly to the following hypotheses, stated in alternative form: 
Has: Damage awards are negatively related to the perceptions of audit quality 
Ha6: Damage awards are positively related to the expectations of audit quality. 
Additional questions which were explored in the experiment described in the following 
section, but were not hypothesized include: 
1. What are the relative differences in overall expectations among 
evaluators? 
2. What are the relative differences in assessments of damage awards among 
evaluators? 
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4.0 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4 .1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the empirical study that examined the relationships among 
five variables. These are: perceptions of audit quality (AQP ), damage awards (DA), the 
amount of the plaintiffs loss (Lt), the auditors' compliance with professional standards 
(Ct) and the subject's a priori expected audit quality (AQe)· The remainder of this 
chapter will describe the subjects, the experimental task, operationalization of the 
variables and the experimental design. 
4.2 Subjects 
The model of expectations, perceptions and satisfaction developed in Chapter 3 
described the behavior of three different groups: jurors, judges and auditors. Three 
groups of subjects corresponding to these groups were obtained. Each group is described 
more fully in the following paragraphs. Summary demographic information regarding 
each group of subjects is provided in Table 1. 
Since the population of jurors is defined rather broadly ( e.g. licensed drivers, 
registered voters), any adult citizens who were not involved in the accounting or legal 
industries were considered to be viable surrogates for actual jury members. Thirty-four 
surrogate jurors were obtained through contacting regional employment and civic 
organizations. In order to participate, all subjects were required to have obtained a high 
school degree or GED. (This requirement was necessary to ensure that each subject had 
the requisite reading ability to accomplish the experimental task.) Approximately 52% 




DESCRIPTION AUDITORS ATTORNEYS JURORS 
# % # % # % 
Males 30 83% 26 76% 12 35% 
Females 6 17% 8 24% 24 65% 
Total Subiects 36 100% 34 100% 34 100% 
Median Years of Experience 5 13 n/a 
Education Level: 
High School Only 4 12% 
Some College 12 35% 
Undergraduate Degree 26 72% 13 38% 
Graduate Degree 10 28% 34 100% 5 15% 
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had a high school degree or GED. Juror subjects were paid $5 as compensation for their 
participation. (In general, juror subjects required approximately 1 hour to complete the 
experimental task.) 
Attorneys practicing civil law were used as surrogates for judges.. The use of 
attorneys as surrogates was based on a number of factors. First, judges are typically 
selected from the population of attorneys. Second, judges and attorneys share a common 
background of legal education and training. Third, movement between attorney and 
judge status is common. Thirty-four attorneys were contacted through the Bar 
Association of a large southwestern state. Approximately 79% of this group had 
practiced law for 10 or more years, and the median experience level for this group was 
13 years. 
Thirty-six auditors were obtained through four Big Six firms and one regional 
public accounting firm. Each firm supplied a minimum of 6 participants. All auditors 
had at least 2 years of experience (i.e., senior level or above). Approximately 35% of 
this group had 10 or more years of experience in public accounting, and the median 
experience level for this group was 5 years. 
4.3 The Pilot Test 
The test instrument was initially pilot tested using students. The purpose of the 
pilot study was twofold. First, the pilot study was used to test the validity of measures 
developed specifically for this study. Second, the pilot study was used to search for any 
deficiencies in the test instrument and to obtain data which could be compared to the rest 
of the test results. Both students who had and had not yet taken an auditing class were 
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asked to participate. 
The results of the pilot test were used to refine the final test instrument. These 
results indicated that subjects comprehended the subject matter covered and questions 
asked in the test instrument. More importantly, the results of the pilot test indicated that 
the manipulations of the independent variables were successful. Verbal and written 
feedback from the subjects suggested some minor format changes which were 
incorporated into the final test instrument. 
4.4 The Experimental Task 
This experiment was a role-playing task. A single test instrument was developed 
for this study. The instrument was administered simultaneously to groups of auditors, 
attorneys and jurors who completed the instrument individually. Subjects proceeded 
through the instrument following the instructions of the administrator. The same 
individual served as administrator throughout the experiment. 
A short ( 10 minute) introductory presentation was provided to jurors and 
attorneys. The written part of this presentation is included in Appendix A. The purpose 
of the presentation was to briefly define terms such as fmancial statements, audit, audit 
workpapers, etc. This presentation was omitted for the auditors. At the conclusion of 
the introductory presentation, each subject's a priori expectations of audit quality were 
solicited. 
Next, each subject read an hypothetical litigation case involving an investment 
group's allegation of audit failure. This case has been included in Appendix B. This 
portion of the test instrument was adapted from several actual litigation cases. The case 
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included a brief introduction instructing the participant as to his/her role (juror, judge, 
auditor), the fundamental nature of the case (complainant, respondent and allegations), 
and the opening arguments. Each participant was encouraged to read the case 
information carefully and take notes if he/she wished. 
The subjects were then asked to read nine independent scenarios in which the 
remaining evidence in the case was presented. These scenarios represent all possible 
combinations of three levels of two independent variables ( discussed in the next section). 
Three of these scenarios showing each level of the independent variables have been 
included in Appendix C. Evidence presented by both the complainant and the auditors 
was included to preserve some of the ambiguity that exists in actual litigation. After 
reading a scenario, each subject responded to a series of questions representing 
manipulation checks and measures of the dependent variables. These questions have 
been included in Appendix D. As each new scenario was introduced, subjects were 
instructed that they could not refer back to the preceding scenario(s). Each scenario was 
printed on different colored paper so thatthe administrator of the test instrument could 
observe the subjects' progress through the instrument and ensure that these directions 
were followed. 
4.5 Independent Variables 
There were three independent variables of interest in this study - expected audit 
quality (AQe), the amount of the plaintiffs loss (Li) and the degree of the auditors' 
compliance with professional standards (CJ. AQe was measured for each subject at the 
beginning of the experiment. Both Lt and Ct were manipulated at three levels, resulting 
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in the nine scenarios which were provided to each subject. 
4.5.1 Expected Audit Quality - AQe 
Evidence of an expectation gap in auditing has previously been obtained through 
descriptive research involving responses to questionnaires or surveys. For purposes of 
this study, a measure of expected audit quality was developed. One approach to 
measuring expectations is to ask a simple question regarding subjects' strength of 
expectations. However, Spector (1992) suggested that single measures of variables are 
often unreliable and invalid. Thus, a summated rating scale was developed for this 
experiment, and was designed to measure the subject's normative beliefs about the 
quality of service that auditors should provide. 
The expectation measure was developed using a sample of 103 students who did 
not participate in the pilot study. Of these 103 students, 51 were emolled in an auditing 
course, while the remainder were emolled in an accounting principles course. Using a 
seven-point rating scale, subjects were asked to respond to 18 statements representing 
four constructs about expectations of auditors and auditing. The four constructs were: 
the predictive/feedback value of the audit report; the level of assurance provided by the 
auditors; the conduct of the audit; and the auditors' compliance with professional 
standards. 
Subjects' responses were analyzed using coefficient alpha and the original 
constructs. The results indicated that only three of the four constructs were perceived as 
significant (coefficient alpha~ .50). The fourth construct, the auditors' compliance with 
professional standards, was insignificant, and was eliminated from the final scale. For 
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the remaining constructs, if a statement's correlation with the construct was less than 
35%, that statement was eliminated. Through this process, the number of statements 
was reduced to 10. Tables 2-4 present the constructs, statements and the associated 
statistics. 
An orthogonally rotated principal component analysis was also generated on the 
remaining 10 statements, specifying three constructs. As in the preceding analysis, the 
same statements loaded on each of the three factors in the principal component analysis. 
These loadings are presented in Table 5. 
As a result, these 10 statements wete included in the test instrument used in the 
experiment. Subjects' responses to these statements were summed and averaged and 
used as a measure of expectations. 
4.5.2 The Plaintiffs Loss - Lt 
The amount of the plaintiff's loss, Lt , was presented as the uncollectible portion 
of ~e loan due to the investment group, and was manipulated at three levels. This 
variable was presented as undisputed evidence in each scenario. The levels were chosen 
based on a review of several actual litigation suits and on Palmrose's (1991) study which 
indicated that inflation adjusted damages for lawsuits alleging audit failure tend to be 
less than $10,000,000. The loss ranged from $250,000 or 5% of the loan balance (low), 
to $2,500,000, or 50% of the loan balance (moderate), to $5,000,000 or 100% of the loan 
balance (high). 
4.5.3 The Auditor's Compliance - Ct 
The auditor's compliance with professional standards, Ct , was manipulated at 
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TABLE2 
Correlation Analysis - Expectations 
Construct 1 
CONSTRUCT: PREDICTIVE VALUE RAW VARIABLES 
(Cronbach's Alpha= .70) 
Correlation 
Statements with Total Alpha: 
Audit reports should predict the future 
financial stability of the audited company. .48 .65 
Auditors should protect the financial 
security of investors and creditors·ofthe 
audited company. .49 .65 
Audit reports should predict the future 
success or failure of the audited company. .59 .52 
TABLE3 
Correlation Analysis - Expectations 
Construct2 
CONSTRUCT: AUDITORS' 
ASSURANCE RAW VARIABLES 
(Cronbach's Alpha= .70) 
Correlation 
Statements with Total Alpha 
Auditors should ensure that audited 
financial statements contain no significant 
deliberate distortions. .57 .57 
Audit reports should provide reasonable 
assurance about the accuracy of the 
audited :financial statements. .40 .68 
Auditors should ensure that audited 
financial statements contain no deliberate 
distortions. .65 .52 
Auditors should ensure that audited 
financial statements contain no accidental 




(Cronbach's Alpha= .70) 
Correlation 






(Cronbach's Alpha= .71) 
Correlation 






Correlation Analysis - Expectations 
Construct3 
CONSTRUCT: AUDITCONDUCT RAW VARIABLES 
(Cronbach's Alpha= .70) 
Correlation 
Statements with Total Alpha 
Auditing should be conducted like any other 
business. .43 .71 
Auditors should conduct the audit in a way 
that best serves the auditing firm. .61 .50 
Auditors should conduct the audit in a way 
that best serves the management of the 




(Cronbach's Alpha= .70) 
Correlation 





PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS 
EXPECTATION MEASURES 
FACTOR LOADINGS 
Expectation Measures Predictive Auditors' 
Value Assurance 
Audit reports should predict the financial stability 
of the audited company. 0.5519 0.07146 
Audit should protect the financial security of 
investors and creditors of the audited company. 0.57419 0.09058 
Audit reports should predict the future success or 
failure of the audited company. 0.82616 -0.04690 
Auditors should ensure that audited financial 
statements contain no significant deliberate 
distortions. -0.04573 0.78535 
Audit reports should provide reasonable assurance 
about the accuracy of the audited financial 
statements. -0.06291 0.49491 
Auditors should ensure that audited financial 
statements contain no deliberate distortions. 0.13634 0.80530 
Auditing should ensure that audited financial 
statements contain no accidental distortions. 0.14748 0.42864 
Auditors should be conducted like any other 
business. 0.21156 0.09478 
Auditors should conduct the audit in a way that 
best serves the auditing firm. 0.04238 -0.15679 
Auditors should conduct the audit in a way that 














three levels (low, moderate and high). This variable was operationalized by arguable 
evidence regarding the auditor's compliance with six professional standards. These six 
standards were chosen based on a review of actual litigation cases and Palmrose's ( 1991) 
study. Based on this review, allegations of audit failure generally involved at least one of 
these six standards. In each scenario, subjects were provided with a summary of the 
complainant's and, then, the respondent's arguments regarding the auditors' compliance 
with the standard. The three levels of C1 were achieved by altering the number of 
standards which were contested and the strength of the testimony. 
4.6 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables were audit quality perceptions (AQP) and damage awards 
(DA). Two measures of each dependent variable were obtained. These variables were 
measured after each subject had completed reading a scenario, and before the subject 
proceeded to the next scenario. Perceived audit quality was measured on a seven-point 
rating scale ranging from "very low" to "very high". Damage awards were measured 
using both a seven-point rating scale ranging from "as low as possible" to "as high as 
possible" and a separate scale listing possible ranges of damage awards. Responses for 
the two measures of each dependent variables were averaged for the remaining analysis. 
Correlations of each measure of the dependent variables are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
4. 7 Experimental Design 
This study is a 3x3x3 factorial design with three groups (GROUP) which 
constitute a between-group variable, and 2 variables, loss (LJ and compliance (CJ, which 
are within-group, repeated measures. Every subject received all combinations of the 
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TABLE6 
AUDIT QUALITY PERCEPTIONS 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLE MEASURES 
Second Measure - AQp 
First Measure Treatment 
AQD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Treatment 1 0.76. 0.29 0.12 0.45• 0.25 0.01 0.43• 0.21 
Treatment 2 0.63* 0.47• 0.30 0.42• 0.28 0.14 0.49* 
Treatment3 0.77· 0.24 0.42* 0.58* 0.14 0.36 
Treatment4 0.10· 0.26 0.08 0.51* 0.21 
Treatment 5 0.59* 0.41• 0.22 0.59° 
Treatment6 0.81* 0.08 0.40° 
Treatment7 0.65° 0.39° 
Treatment 8 0.76° 
Treatment9 














CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLE MEASURES 
Second Measure of DA 
First Measure Treatment 
DA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Treatment 1 0_57• o.58* 0.52• 0.31 0.39• 0.41 • 0.46* 0.34 
Treatment2 0.10· 0.62· 0.37 0.49* 0.66* o.55° 0.62* 
Treatment3 0.75* 0.34 o.s1· 0.10· 0.45• 0.56. 
Treatment4 0.59* 0.45• 0.37* 0.61° 0.41 
Treatment 5 0.61° 0.54° 0.53* 0.60· 
Treatment6 0.66. 0.30 o.50° 
Treatment? 0.69° o.58" 
Treatment 8 0.73* 
Treatment9 












repeated measure treatments, with the order of the treatments varied to test for possible 
order effects. Expected audit quality (AQe) was elicited, not manipulated. 
Hypotheses 1 through 4 which involve subjects' perceptions of audit quality (AQP) 
were tested using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), contrasts and profile 
analysis. Hypotheses 5 and 6 which involve damage awards (DA) were tested using 
regression analysis. 
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5.0 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5 .1 Manipulation Checks 
Recall that each scenario in the test instrument represented one treatment which 
combined the manipulations of the independent variables, loss (Li) and compliance (CJ. 
After reading each scenario, subjects used a seven- point rating scale to provide a 
manipulation check, or a description of the level of each variable in that particular 
scenario. Manipulations were successful if subjects identified three distinct levels of 
each variable. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedure was used to determine the 
effectiveness of the manipulations. Scheff e's test was used to investigate specific 
differences among the manipulation check responses by group and to control for type 1 
experimental error rate. The results of the manipulation checks are presented in Table 8. 
Both auditors and attorneys recognized three significantly different levels of both 
variables. This indicates that these groups adequately differentiated among the 
manipulations. Jurors, on the other hand, perceived no significant differences between 
the moderate and high levels of both Lt and Ct. However, jurors did recognize that these 
higher levels of the manipulations were significantly different from the low manipulation 
of both variables. This indicates that the manipulations were only partially successful for 
the juror group. 
Jurors could participate in this study only if they were unschooled in legal or 
accounting matters. Furthermore, these jurors were given a short time period in which to 




























* significantly different from other means for the same group of subjects, Scheffe's 
test (ex= .05) 
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"low" or "high" may suggest an effort to simplify these complexities to dualistic terms. 
That the jurors only perceived Lt as "low" or "high" indicates that the jurors understood 
the relative differences between a loss in the thousands versus a loss in the millions. 
However, these results indicate that the moderate and high losses were so large to jurors 
that they did not differentiate between the.amounts. 
Although the manipulations were not successful for the juror subjects, it is 
important to recall that the levels of the manipulations were chosen based on actual 
litigation cases. Furthermore, the manipulations were successful for two of the three 
subject groups. As a result, the data were analyzed using 3 levels of the manipulated 
variables. 
5 .2 MANOV A- Audit Quality Perceptions 
The first part of this study required analyzing audit quality perceptions (AQp) for 
every treatment and each group. Means and standard deviations of the dependent 
variable AQp, by treatment and group are presented in Table 9. 
A repeated measures MANOVA was used to test hypotheses 1 through 4. An 
omnibus test was used to examine the null hypothesis of no overall effect for each of the 
main effects of the two independent variables, Lt and Ct, and their interactions. The 
results of the omnibus tests are presented in Table 10. Since Wilk's Lambda, Pillai's 
Trace, Hotelling-Lawley Trace and Roy's Greatest Root yielded the same results, only 
values of the Wilk's Lambda statistic are reported. 
The loss and group interaction (Lt x Group) as well as the compliance and group 
interaction ( Ct x Group) were significant at the multivariate level. These interactions 
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TABLE9 
AUDIT QUALITY PERCEPTIONS 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
TREATMENT AUDIT QUALITY PERCEPTIONS (AQJ 
--
Loss (Li) Compliance (C,) ALL AUDITORS ATTORNEYS JURORS 
Low Low 3.25 3.54 3.07 3.13 
(1.54) (1.53) (1.43) (1.66) 
Low Moderate 4.69 5.56 4.32 4.13 
(1.52) (1.16) (1.39) (1.61) 
Low High 5.18 6.29 4.87 4.32 
(1.71) (1.05) (1.53) (1.85) 
Moderate Low 2.99 3.19 2.79 2.96 
(1.43) (1.44) (1.23) (1.60) 
Moderate Moderate 4.51 5.35 3.74 4.40 
(1.47) (1.03) (1.27) (1.62) 
Moderate High 4.95 6.33 4.18 4.25 
(1.70) (0.72) (1.53) (1.72) 
High Low 2.89 3.11 2.51 3.04 
(1.44) (1.35) (1.26) (1.65) 
High Moderate 4.54 5.50 3.93 4.15 
(1.54) (1.03) (1.50) (1.56) 
High High 5.06 · 6.33 4.24 4.53 
(1.68) (0.85) (1.43) (1.80) 








Lt X ct X Group 
TABLE 10 
AUDIT QUALITY PERCEPTIONS 
MANOVA - OMNIBUS TEST STATISTICS 
TEST CRITERIA 
Wilk's F num den 
Lambda Value df df Pr>F 
0.8886 6.27 2 100 0.0027 
0.3548 90.92 2 100 0.0001 
0.9750 0.63 4 98 0.6427 
0.8888 3.04 4 200 0.0185 
0.7989 5.94 4 200 0.0002 
0.9041 1.27 8 196 0.2632 
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imply that group means of AQP differ among the levels of Lt and C1, respectively. As a 
result, the main effects of Lt and Ct, though significant at the multivariate level, may not 
be interpretable. For each of these interactions,. contrast analyses were used to compare 
the univariate differences among groups at every level of the independent variables, as 
well as differences in group responses to increases in the independent variables. 
5.2.1 Compliance and Group Interaction 
Figure 4 demonstrates the Ct x Group interaction. In essence, the figure shows 
the effects on each group's perceptions of increasing compliance given the amount of the 
loss. Table 11 shows the group means and standard deviations of AQP at each level of Ct. 
At the low level, there were no significant differences among the audit quality 
perceptions of the groups. Furthermore, at the moderate and high levels of compliance, 
there were no significant differences between the judicial evaluators. However, at the 
moderate and high levels of compliance, auditors' quality perceptions were significantly 
higher (ex= .05) than judicial evaluators. 
Table 12 shows the marginal effect on perceived audit quality of increasing levels 
of compliance. While increases in C1 increased the AQP of all groups, the auditors' 
reaction was significantly more positive than the reaction of the judicial evaluators. 
Once again, differences between the two groups of judicial evaluators were not 
significant. 
5.2.2 Loss and Group Interaction 
Figure 5 shows the Lt x Group interaction. Here, the figure demonstrates the 
effect on each group's audit quality perceptions of increasing the plaintiffs loss given 
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Figure 4 


























AUDIT QUALITY PERCEPTIONS 
ANALYSIS OF INTERACTIONS 
AUDIT QUALITY PERCEPTIONS (AQp) 
AUDITORS ATTORNEYS JURORS 
5.13* 4.09 3.86 
(0.92) (0.94) (1.35) 
4.96* 3.57 3.87 
(0.79) (0.91) (1.24) 
4.98* 3.56 3.91 
(0.83) (1.12) (1.37) 
3.28 2.79 3.04 
(1.30) (1.10) (1.46) 
5.47* 4.00 4.23 
(0.94) (1.18) (1.44) 
6.32* 4.43 4.37 
(0.74) (1.17) (1.55) 





Effect of increasing Lt from: 
Low to Moderate 
Moderate to High 
CtxGROUP 
Effect of increasing Ct from: 
Low to Moderate 
Moderate to High 
• - significant at "' = . 01. 
•• - significant at"'= .05. 
••• - significant at"' = .10. 
TABLE 12 




OVERALL vs. vs. 
CONTRAST ATTORNEY JUROR 
5.16. 4.51 .. 1.15 
0.99 0.99 0.99 
1.25• 10.55* 10.98* 









compliance. As shown in Table 11, at every level of Lt:, the auditors' quality perceptions 
were significantly higher than judicial evaluators' quality perceptions. Jurors' and 
attorneys' quality perceptions were not significantly different from one another at any 
level ofloss. 
Table 12 shows the marginal effects of increasing the levels of loss. Here, there 
are two items of importance. First, increasing Lt from moderate to high had no 
significant overall effect across the groups.. Second, when Lt increased from low to 
moderate jurors' and auditors' AQP remained essentially the same~ however, attorneys' 
AQP decreased significantly. 
5.2.3 Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1 stated that audit quality perceptions would be negatively related to 
the amount of the plaintiffs loss. Investigation of the Lt x Group interaction revealed that 
this negative relationship was only present for the attorney subjects, and only as Lt 
increased from low to moderate. 
The different perspective of the attorney group may be attributable to the 
popularity of contingent fee arrangements in the legal profession. When attorney's fees 
are contingent on the amount of the damage award, their remuneration is generally some 
function of the amount lost. Thus, the attorney group may be reacting to the increased 
economic feasibility of the case as the plaintiffs loss increases from a low to a moderate . 
level. 
Although auditors and jurors AQP were not affected by increases in Lt:, the main 
effect of Lt remains significant for auditors and jurors. However, for these groups, the 
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negative relationship predicted by Hypothesis 1 is generally unsupported. 
Hypothesis 2 stated that audit quality perceptions were positively related to the 
auditor's compliance with professional standards. Investigation of the Ct x Group 
interaction revealed that this relationship was significant only for auditors. Thus, 
increases in compliance result in significant increases in quality perceptions for auditors. 
While the main effect of Ct remains significant for judicial evaluators, the expected 
relationship posited in Hypothesis 2 was not supported for attorneys and jurors. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that auditors would rely more on compliance than would 
judicial evaluators in forming audit quality perceptions. As expected, auditors' AQP was 
significantly higher than judicial evaluators at the moderate and high levels of C1, 
Furthermore, auditors were the only group to exhibit a statistically significant, positive 
reaction to increases in Ct. Together, this indicated that compliance was very important 
to auditors' quality perceptions. (The lack of significant differences at the low level of Ct 
may also suggest that auditors recognize and are punitive about failure to establish a 
minimum level of compliance.) Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported. 
Hypothesis 4 stated that judicial evaluators would rely more on the plaintiff's loss 
than would auditors in forming quality perceptions. As expected, judicial evaluators' 
AQP is significantly lower than auditors' at all levels of loss. Additionally, responses to 
increases in Lt were either flat Gurors) or negative (attorneys). Taken together, this 
indicates that the existence of a plaintiff's loss ( regardless of the size) is enough to 
"fixate" judicial evaluators at a lower AQP than auditors. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was 
supported. 
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5.3 Regression Analysis - Damage Awards 
The second part of the experiment entailed identifying the role that audit quality 
expectations (AQ.,) and perceptions (AQP) serve in determining satisfaction, as 
operationalized by the amount of damages awarded (DA). For this portion of the 
experiment, the independent variables were AQ.,, the expectation measure elicited at the 
beginning of the experiment, and AQp, the perception measure that was the dependent 
measure in the MANOV A described previously 
AQ., responses were summed and averaged by group, as shown in Table 13. 
(Subjects' responses were coded in reverse, such that lower means correspond to lower 
expectations, and higher means correspond to higher expectations.) Overall, 
expectations were significantly different among the three groups, with auditors having 
the lowest expectations and jurors having the highest expectations. 
The dependent variable, DA, was obtained for each group at each of the nine 
scenarios. Mean responses and standard deviations by treatment and group are presented 
in Table 14. 
Regression analysis was used to test Hypotheses 5 and 6 that damages awards are 
negatively related to AQP and positively related to AQ.,. The following regression 
equation was tested: 
(3) 
Results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 15. The model indicated a lack 
of multicollinearity (variance inflation factor <10), and the overall variance accounted 
for (R.2} was approximately 65%. 
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TABLE 13 
EXPECTED AUDIT QUALITY 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
AQe 
EXPECTATION MEASURES All Auditors Attorneys 
Audit reports should reflect the future financial 4.01 2.97 3.76 
stability of the audited company. (2.13) (1.81) (2.06) 
Auditors should protect the financial security of 5.59 4.25· 6.09 
investors and creditors of the audited (1.97) (2.08) (1. 73) 
company. 
Audit reports should predict the future success 2.70 1.38" 2.97 
or failure of the audited company. (1.89) (0.84) (1.77) 
Auditors should ensure that audited financial 
statements contain no significant deliberate 2.54 2.77 1.88· 
distortions. (1.63) (1.40) (1.25) 
Audit reports should provide reasonable 
assurance about the accuracy of the audited 6.36 6.64b 6.41 
financial statements. (1.20) (0.59) (1.21) 
Auditors should ensure that audited financial 3.57 3.33 3.35 
statements contain no deliberate distortions. (2.00) (1. 71) (2.01) 
Auditors should ensure that the audited 2.76 2.83 1.85" 
financial statements contain no accidental (1.79) (1.58) (1.35) 
distortions. 
Auditing should be conducted like any other 5.96 5.36· 6.24 
profitable business. (1.41) (1.59) (1.37) 
Auditors should conduct the audit in a way that 4.72 5.27" 4.18 
best serves the auditing firm. (1. 78) (1.52) (1.57) 
Auditors should conduct the audit in a way that 5.16 3.61· 5.62 
best serves the management of the audited (1.94) (2.03) (1.56) 
firm. 
SUMMED AND AVERAGED RESPONSE 4.33 3.84d 4.24d 
(0.93) (0.76) (0.79) 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
• Group means is significantly different ( oc=. 05) from other group means of the same measure. 
b Group means of auditors and jurors are significantly different ( oc = .05). 
c Group means of auditors and attorneys are significantly different ("' = . 05). 



























MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
TREATMENT DAMAGE AWARDS 
Loss (Lt) Compliance (C1) ALL AUDITORS ATTORNEYS 
Low Low 2.92 2.40 2.78 
(1.41) (1.01) (1.10) 
Low Moderate 2.31 1.60 2.37 
(1.41) (0.74) (1.05) 
Low High 2.09 1.17 2.16 
(1.49) (0.46) (1.17) 
Moderate Low 3.59 3.00 3.78 
(1.43) (1.01) (1.17) 
Moderate Moderate 2.56 1.86 2.78 
(1.40) (0.74) (1.15) 
Moderate High 2.29 1.28 2.62 
(1.43) (0.44) (1.06) 
High Low 3.85 3.28 4.25 
(1.55) (1.24) (1.39) 
High Moderate 2.67 1.83 3.16 
(1.45) (0.74) (1.41) 
High High 2.37 1.24 2.93 





















In order to test Hypotheses 5 and 6, the direction and significance of the beta 
coefficients (b1 and b2) of the two independent variables AQP and AQe were examined 
overall and for each group. As expected, the overall coefficients were both significant at 
ex = . 0001 and the sign of each coefficient was as hypothesized. 
The regression analysis was also conducted for each group.. Results of these 
regression analyses are also presented in Table 15. As expected, the coefficients for 
perceptions and expectations were both significant and in the right direction for jurors 
and attorneys. However, for the auditors, the sign of the expectation coefficient was 
negative and was not significant. This seems to suggest that there is no disconfirmation 
effect for auditors. It may also imply that the auditors' expectations encompass more or 
different dimensions than are represented in the expectation measure used herein. 
In order to corroborate these findings indicating differences between auditors and 
judicial evaluators, a second regression model was created. Using 2 dummy variables 
representing group classification, the following regression model tested the strength and 
direction of association of the independent variables on damage award assessments 
between auditors and judicial evaluators: 
DA =ho+ h1AQe + b2AQP + b3Dl + b4D2 + bs(Dl*AQe) + b6(D2*AQe) + 
blDl*AQP) + bs(D2*AQP) 
where 
D 1 = dummy variable equal to 1 when group is attorneys and 0 
otherwise 
D2 = dummy variable equal to 1 when group is jurors and O otherwise 
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As shown in Table 16, each of the dummy variables and their interactions with 
the independent variables were significant ( ex = . 0001) and in the predicted direction. 
This indicates that when assessing damage awards, judicial evaluators and auditors differ 
in their utilization of audit quality perceptions and expectations, i.e. the slopes of the 
regression lines are different. 
Thus, the regression analyses provide support for Hypotheses 5. With respect to 
all groups, these results indicate that damage awards are negatively related to perceptions 
of audit quality. However, these results provide only partial support for Hypothesis 6, 



























ESTIMATE ERROR T 
4.33 0.1789 24.22 
0.28 0.0336 8.38 
-0.66 .0174 -38.05 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
ESTIMATE ERROR T 
4.89 0.1843 26.52 
-0.05 0.0401 -1.12 
-0.55 0.0175 -31.37 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
ESTIMATE ERROR T 
4.91 0.2709 18.13 
0.17 0.0571 2.99 
-0.71 0.0285 -24.87 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
ESTIMATE ERROR T 
4.08 0.4893 8.35 
0.40 0.0844 4.69 
-0.70 0.0414 -17.00 






























DAMAGE A WARDS - REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
JUDICIAL EVALUATORS vs. AUDITORS 
R2 = 6741 
PARAMETER STANDARD 
df ESTIMATE ERROR T P-VALUE 
1 4.47 0.3084 14.48 .0001 
1 0.05 0.0665 0.77 .4450 
1 -0.55 0.0289 -18.83 .0001 
1 1.75 0.4142 4.22 .0001 
1 2.78 0.3675 7.56 .0001 
1 -0.22 0.0933 -2.33 .0199 
1 -0.45 0.0904 -4.96 .0001 
1 -0.15 0.0437 -3.53 .0004 
1 -0.16 0.0417 -3.75 .0002 
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6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes and discusses the results of the study. The study's 
contributions, limitations and implications for future research are also presented. 
6.1 Discussion 
The model presented in Chapter 3 describes the significance and influence of 
expectations, the amount of the plaintiffs loss and the degree of the auditor's compliance 
with professional standards on perceptions of audit quality and satisfaction with the 
audit. Overall, regarding audit quality, the results of the experiment indicate that both 
the amount of the loss and the auditor's compliance are significant factors affecting each 
group's perceptions of audit quality. Similarly, the results suggest that both expectations 
and perceptions of audit quality are significant factors affecting the determination of 
satisfaction with the audit, as measured by damage awards. However, the most 
interesting implications of these results lie in the analysis of differences among the 
subject groups of auditors, attorneys and jurors.· These differences and their implications 
are explored further in the remainder of this section. 
6.1.1 Perceptions of Audit Quality 
The model presented in Chapter 3 suggests that two audit quality cues, the 
amount of the plaintiffs loss and the degree of the auditor's compliance with professional 
standards, will be important determinants of audit quality perceptions. Recall that the 
weak form of the outcome bias presented by the model suggests that evaluators will rely 
on both outcome information (the plaintiff's loss) and process information (how well the 
auditor complied with professional standards). The model also suggests differences in 
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cue utilization between auditors and judicial evaluators .. 
The results of this study provide evidence that the auditor's compliance with 
standards is an important cue utilized by auditors in forming perceptions of audit quality. 
However, the results do not support any form of outcome bias for auditors. In general, 
given the same set of circumstances, auditors' perceptions of audit quality are 
significantly higher than either jurors' or attorneys' perceptions. Likewise, auditors' 
perceptions increase significantly as the degree of compliance increases, and auditors' 
perceptions are essentially umesponsive to increases in the amount of the plaintiffs loss. 
The single exception to this result occurs when the auditor's degree of compliance with 
professional standards is low. When this occurs, auditors' perceptions of audit quality 
are as low as those of both groups of judicial evaluators.. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that once a minimum degree of compliance has been established, auditors' 
perceptions of audit quality will exceed judicial evaluators' perceptions. 
In general, attorneys' and jurors' perceptions of audit quality tend to be 
umesponsive to increases in the amount of the plaintiffs loss or the degree of 
compliance. The one exception occurs for attorneys when the plaintiffs loss increases 
from low to moderate. As discussed in Chapter 5, this may reflect the economic viability 
of trying the case when the attorney's fee is contingent upon a successful verdict. 
Although the marginal change in perceptions of audit quality tends to be insignificant, it 
is important to note that both groups of judicial evaluators perceive audit quality to be 
significantly lower than auditors. This indicates some outcome bias, i.e. that the mere 
existence of the lawsuit is enough to fix the judicial evaluators' perceptions at a lower 
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point, regardless of the evidence. There is no support for the idea that judicial evaluators' 
perceptions are significantly altered by the degree of the auditor's compliance with 
standards. 
6.1.2 Audit Dissatisfaction 
The model presented in Chapter 3 suggests that audit dissatisfaction, as 
represented by the absolute value of the damage award, will be negatively related to 
perceptions of audit quality and positively related to expected audit quality. These 
relationships were observed for both groups of judicial evaluators. This finding indicates 
that damage awards can be decreased either by increasing a judicial evaluator's 
perception of the audit quality or by decreasing the judicial evaluator's expectation of the 
audit quality. For groups of auditors, the negative relationship between damage awards 
and perceptions was observed, but there was also an insignificant, negative relationship 
between damage awards and expectations. As indicated in Chapter 4, this result may 
indicate that auditors' expectations are more sophisticated than judicial evaluators' and 
are not fully captured by the expectation measure used in this study, or it may merely 
suggest that expectations play an unimportant role in determining auditors' satisfactions 
with an audit.. 
6.1.3 Implications 
The results of this study have several implications. First, the auditing profession 
must recognize that audit quality as defined by auditors is not necessarily representative 
of definitions used by judicial evaluators in determining audit culpability and liability .. 
Second, judicial evaluators' expectations of audit quality are significantly higher than 
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auditors' expectations. The ability of judicial evaluators to parlay their lower perceptions 
and higher expectations of audit quality into damage awards payable by the profession 
give the somewhat abstract expectation gap its "teeth". Further research is needed to 
investigate the characteristics of audit quality as defined by judicial evaluators and to 
better understand how judicial evaluators' expectations are formed and changed. 
Third, these results indicate the existence of a type of outcome bias against the 
auditing profession. This bias may indicate that the mere allegation of audit failure 
signals poor audit quality to judicial evaluators. Unfortunately, this bias does not seem 
responsive to evidence of compliance with professional standards which is often the 
heart of a "due care" defense .. Further research is needed to determine how this bias can 
be overcome. 
6.2 Contributions 
This study makes several contributions to the auditing literature. First, this study 
provides a theoretical framework, unique to the auditing literature, which describes the 
relationships among perceptions and expectations of audit quality and audit liability. 
This framework establishes a means by which efforts to increase perceptions of audit 
quality and reduce audit liability can be assessed. Second, this study provides for a direct 
analysis of the components of the expectation gap. The model hypothesizes differences 
in perceptions that may be the source of the expectation gap, and the study allows for 
exploration of differences in expectations, quality perceptions and damage awards. 
Third, this study provides for simultaneous exploration of the effects of outcome bias and 
compliance with professional standards in forming perceptions of audit quality. Fourth, 
62 
this study explores differences in cue utilization between jurors and judges. The right to 
trial by jury rather than a judge exists in most cases; any differences between jurors and 
judges has potential value in reducing audit liability. 
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
The primary limitation of this study is its external validity. Much of the 
ambiguity present in an actual lawsuit is excluded from the test instrument. 
Additionally, the study is limited by the oversimplification of the evidence about the 
audit service. This study focuses on the most likely cues to be presented in a lawsuit; 
however, there are numerous cues which are omitted. Similarly, the effect of other 
information, such as audit firm reputation, audit firm size ( essentially the "Z" variable in 
the model) has been excluded from the laboratory setting; whereas, this information 
would generally be available in the courtroom. Finally, the simplicity of the laboratory 
study provided herein, ignores the effect of group decision making on jurors' perceptions 
and behaviors. 
Addressing each of these limit-ations on the external validity of this proposed 
study provides opportunity for further, more generalizable research in this area. 
Specifically, extensions to model and test the effects of information regarding firm 
reputation and size are suggested. The use of actual case transcripts and group decision 
makers also warrants further investigation. Finally, the model can be extended and 
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APPENDIX A - INTRODUCTORY PRESENTATION 
The following terms will be used throughout the audit case. Please take a few minutes 
and familiarize yourself with these terms as the surveyor discusses them. Please ask 
questions if there is anything you do not understand. 
Creditor - an individual or group that loans money 
Financial Statements - a set of financial information about a company, includes a 
balance sheet, income statement, statement of retained earnings, statement of cash flows 
and related notes describing the statements 
Audit - an examination of a company's financial statements for the purpose of expressing 
an opinion on the financial statements 
Audit Opinion - a report issued by certified public accountants describing their opinion 
of the a company's financial statements 
Audit Workpapers - set of papers generated by auditors on which the process of the 
audit, i.e. the steps performed, conclusions reached, etc. is documented. a record of all 
the work performed during the audit 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) - professional guidelines describing 
how an audit should be conducted 
Material - refers to the concept of something big enough to make a difference to a 
decision maker 
68 
APPENDIX B - EXPECTATION MEASURES 
The following questions were used to measure expectations of audit quality. Subjects 
were asked to respond using a seven- point scale ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly 
Disagree. 
1. Audit reports should reflect the future financial stability of the audited company. 
2. Auditors should ensure that audited financial statements contain no deliberate 
distortions. 
3. Audit reports should predict the future success or failure of the audited company. 
4. Auditors should conduct the audit in a way that best serves the auditing firm. 
5. Audit reports should provide reasonable assurance about the accuracy of the 
audited financial statements. 
6. Auditors should protect the financial security of investors and creditors of the 
audited company. 
7. Auditors should conduct the audit in a way that best serves the management of 
the audited firm. 
8. Auditors should ensure that audited financial statements contain no significant 
deliberate distortions. 
9. Auditing should be conducted like any other profitable business. 





TAYLOR INVESTMENTS vs. ANDREW & MURPHY 
Case Information 
This study is being conducted as part of an accounting research project. Our primary 
goal is to study individual's perceptions of audit litigation. This project is expected to 
last approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour. Your participation in this project is completely 
voluntary, and you may choose to withdraw from the project at any time. Furthermore, 
your responses will remain anonymous and confidential. 
Please read the case information very carefully. When you are through, you will be 
presented with a number of scenarios describing additional evidence about the case. 
Following each of these scenarios, you will be asked to answer four ( 4) questions about 
the scenario. Please select the answer that most closely resembles your honest attitude 
or opinion. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. 
Your surveyor will provide verbal instructions about each scenario and the associated 
questions. Please move through the project as instructed by the surveyor. 
Your responses are very important to us. Please answer all questions included in this 
handout. If you have any questions while you are completing the project, please ask the 
surveyor. We wish to thank you, in advance for your time and cooperation. 
If you have any additional questions about this project, please feel free to contact the 
surveyor at the following address: 
Kimberly Gladden Burke 
427CBA 
Oklahoma State University 
(405) 744-7567 
PLEASE KEEP TIDS PAGE FOR YOUR RECORDS 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR USING SCALES 
You will be asked to use different scales for rating different things. It is important that 
you feel comfortable using the entire range of the scale. So, please take a moment to 
familiarize yourself with the use of scales. In most questions, you will be asked to 
indicate your agreement or disagreement with a statement. After reading a statement, 
If you feel that you strongly agree with the statement, mark your answer as: 
Strongly Agree 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
If you feel that you strongly disagree with the statement, mark your answer as:. 
Strongly Agree 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
If your feelings are neutral, that is, you neither agree nor disagree with the statement, 
mark your answer as: 
Strongly Agree 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
If you feel that you moderately agree with the statement, mark your answer as: 
Strongly Agree 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
If you feel that you somewhat agree with the statement; mark your answer as: 
Strongly Agree 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
If you have ap.y questions about the scale, ask the surveyor now. 
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7 Strongly 
TAYLOR INVESTMENTS vs. ANDREW & MURPHY 
Introductory Information 
You have been asked to serve on the jury for "Taylor Investments vs. Andrew & 
Murphy". This case involves an alleged audit failure. Taylor Investments, which we will 
call "Taylor", is an investment group that consists of20 people. Taylor has also lent 
money to Regal, Inc. which we will call "Regal". Taylor is suing Andrew & Murphy, 
Certified Public Accountants, which is Regal's audit furn. We will refer to Andrew & 
Murphy as the "Auditors." 
Regal, a national mail-order retailer, first borrowed money from Taylor in 1990. The 
loan was secured by a pledge of inventory in the amount of75% of the collateral. In 
other words, for every $75 of inventory owned by Regal, Regal was allowed to borrow 
$100 from Taylor. The terms of the agreement stated that Regal would provide Taylor 
with audited financial statements for each year ending December 31. By December, 
1992, Regal had borrowed $5 million ($5,000,000), based on $3,750,000 worth of 
inventory. 
Regal's 1992 annual report was completed and delivered to Taylor in June of 1993. The 
annual report included the financial statements and an unqualified audit opinion signed 
by the Auditors .. This unqualified opinion says that the 1992 financial statements 
"present fairly, in all material respects," Regal's financial position. If the Auditors had 
found that the financial statements did not present Regal's financial position fairly, the 
Auditors would have issued a different type of audit opinion. In November of 1993, 
Regal became unable to repay its loan to Taylor. Since Regal had no assets to repay the 
loan, Taylor is suing the Auditors in hopes of obtaining cash. 
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TAYLOR INVESTMENTS vs. ANDREW & MURPHY 
Summary of Taylor's Opening Statement 
The Auditors were negligent in auditing Regal's financial statements. Negligent means 
that the Auditors did not conduct the audit the way a "reasonably prudent" auditor 
should. Because of the unqualified audit opinion, Taylor used the financial statements to 
determine if their loans to Regal could be collected. Because Taylor relied on the 
opinion presented by these financial statements, Taylor's investors lost money. Taylor is 
suing the Auditors to recover the amount of the uncollected loans made to Regal. 
Regal hired the Auditors for the express purpose of examining and issuing an opinion on 
Regal's annual financial statements. The Auditors knew that Taylor would review these 
financial statements in connection with the loan. The Auditors issued a standard, 
unqualified opinion on the 1992 financial statements. This kind of opinion is called a 
"clean" opinion. 
Taylor received the 1992 financial statements in June of 1993. The statements showed 
that Regal had borrowed $5 million ($5,000,000), and that Regal had $3,750,000 worth 
of inventory. Regal told Taylor that it had expanded its inventory to meet increasing 
sales demand in its new regions. However, the fact is that four ofRegal's officers, 
including the president and three vice-presidents conspired to misstate both the quantity 
and cost of the inventory in the 1992 financial statements. In fact, there was actually 
less than $3,750,000 worth of inventory. These officers had created artificial companies, 
complete with falsified purchase orders and vendor invoices to mislead the Auditors 
about the amount of inventory. In fact, payments that Regal made to these artificial 
companies went directly into the officers' pockets. 
The audit opinion states that audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards (GAAS). GAAS is a set of guidelines set by auditors to provide the 
minimum set of standards for an audit. Since GAAS is often vague and broad, auditors 
must exercise prudent, professional judgement in applying these standards. Taylor will 
present evidence that the Auditors did not comply with these standards and failed to 
exercise good judgement. If the Auditors had complied with these standards and 
exercised good judgement, the misstated inventory balances would have been discovered. 
Furthermore, by performing this audit, the Auditors have a responsibility to protect 
Taylor's financial interests. Since Taylor is unable to collect the balance of the loan, the 
Auditors should be held liable for failing to protect Taylor's financial interests. 
On June 5, 1993, the day the financial statements were received by Taylor's loan officer, 
who sent a memo to Taylor's treasurer. The memo stated that the loan officer reviewed 
the financial statements and accompanying opinion. Based on the financial statements 
and the Auditors' clean opinion, Taylor's loan officer believed the loan would be 
collectible. If Taylor had known on June 5, 1993 that the inventory was too low, Taylor 
would have immediately begun an effort to collect the outstanding loan. Since this 
crucial fact was not known, Taylor did not begin serious collection efforts until the 
officers' scheme was discovered in November 1993. 
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TAYLOR INVESTMENTS vs. ANDREW & MURPHY 
Summary of The Auditor's Opening Statement 
The contract between Regal and the Auditors states that the Auditors were hired to 
perform an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). The 
Auditors performed the audit in accordance with GAAS and exercised good, professional 
judgement based on the evidence available to them at the time of the audit. 
In the audit opinion that accompanied the 1992 financial statements, the auditors wrote: 
" ... the financial statements are the responsibility ofRegal's management. Our 
responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our 
audits." 
The four officers who were involved in the illegal scheme are Regal's management. 
Much of the evidence that supports these financial statements was fabricated in order to 
mislead the Auditors. Because of the elaborate nature of the scheme, there was no 
reason for the Auditors to believe that the evidence was fabricated. Therefore, the 
Auditors had no reason to question this evidence when they conducted the audit. 
As stated in the audit opinion, the Auditors followed GAAS. GAAS requires only that 
the Auditors get a "reasonable assurance" about whether the financial statements are free 
from material misstatement. Reasonable assurance is not the same as an absolute 
guarantee. The nature of an audit is that only a portion of a company's documents is 
examined. No audit reviews 100% of the evidence. As a result, all audits involve some 
risk and uncertainty. Both Regal and Taylor were aware of the risk and uncertainty 
present in any audit. 
The audit was designed, in accordance with GAAS, to attempt to detect schemes like the 
one devised by Regal's management. Based on their experience with Regal and other 
similar companies, the Auditors estimated the risk of both poor accounting and fraud. 
The Auditors then chose the appropriate audit tests based on this risk assessment. Given 
the information available at the time, the Auditors' risk assessment and audit tests were 
appropriate. That the Auditors did not discover the scheme in no way suggests that the 
audit was deficient or that other auditors would have discovered the scheme. 
The Auditors' workpapers document all the tests and conclusions reached during the 
audit. These workpapers demonstrate that the conclusions reached during the audit were 
supported by the evidence available at that time. In addition, the workpapers show that 
the audit was planned and executed in accordance with GAAS. 
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Remaining Evidence: 
The remaining evidence is presented in nine (9) independent scenarios.. AB you work 
through these scenarios, please remember that the information presented in one scenario 
has no effect on the other scenarios. Each scenario should be treated as if it contains the 
only additional information presented during this case. 
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APPENDIX D - SCENARIOS 
SCENARIO 1: This scenario show the combination of a low loss and a high level of 
compliance. 
TAYLOR WAS UNABLE TO COLLECT $250,000, 
OR 5% OF THE ORIGINAL LOAN BALANCE. 
Summary of Taylor's Testimony: 
• The Auditors did not adequately identify potential fraud risks prior to 
beginning the audit. 
• The audit senior and staff members had 2 years or less of experience in 
the industry and no experience with Regal. All of the audit procedures 
were performed by these staff. 
• The Auditors performed the minimum number of tests required by their 
professional standards. If the Auditors had audited more ofRegal's 
records, the chances of detecting the fraudulent scheme would have 
increased dramatically. 
Summary of the Auditors' Responses: 
• The workpapers show that, in planning the audit, the Auditors identified 
Regal as a "high risk" for misstating the financial statements. Expert 
witnesses testified that the Auditors actively searched for fraud, but the 
collusion of the Regal's officers made detecting their scheme very 
difficult. 
• The audit manager and partner had been assigned to the Regal audit for 3 
years. The manager had 6 years experience in the industry, and the 
partner had 10 years experience in the industry. The manager spoke daily 
with the senior about the audit. 
• The audit workpapers showed how each audit procedure addressed the 
risks present in the Regal audit. Statistical procedures were used to 
determine the sample size reviewed by the Auditors.. Expert witnesses 
testified that the audit procedures were appropriate based on the 
information available to the Auditors at the time. 
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SCENARIO 2: This scenario shows the combination of a high loss and low level of 
compliance. 
TAYLOR WAS UNABLE TO COLLECT $5,000,000 
OR 100% OF THE ORIGINAL LOAN BALANCE. 
Summary of Taylor's Testimony:-
• The Auditors' workpapers show that they did not recognize several fraud 
risks during the audit. Expert witnesses testified that the Auditors ignored 
several well-known "red :flags" that indicate potential risks. 
• There were several unresolved discrepancies documented in the 
workpapers. Some of these discrepancies included invoices fabricated by 
the fictitious companies owned by Regal's officers. 
• The audit partner had been assigned to the Regal audit for several years, 
and had become a personal friend of Regal's President. The Partner 
discussed many of the unusual items discovered during the audit with 
Regal's President. Based on these discussions, the Auditors did not 
perform any additional work on these items. 
• Only 35% of the audit workpapers were reviewed by the audit manager 
and partner before the audit opinion was released. 
• The audit workpapers · showed that the Auditors did not perform all of the 
procedures they had planned. Expert witnesses testified that the Auditors' 
did not have enough evidence to issue a clean opinion. 
Summary of the Auditors' Responses: 
• The workpapers showed that the Auditors had identified Regal as "low 
risk" for fraud in planning the audit. The Auditors followed a standard 
audit program designed for "low risk" audits. 
• The audit opinion refers to the financial statements taken as a whole. 
Individual discrepancies or differences are not necessarily significant. 
• The Partner testified that the audit could not be conducted efficiently 
without relying on the integrity of Regal's upper management. And, at 
the time of the audit, the Partner had no reason to believe the President 
was involved in any fraudulent scheme. 
• The Partner and manager met with the audit staff to discuss any issues 
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that the staff felt were important before issuing the audit opinion. 
• The significant audit procedures were completed. These were the same 
audit procedures that were completed in the prior year. 
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SCENARIO 3: This scenario shows the combination of a moderate loss and a moderate 
level of compliance. 
TAYLOR WAS UNABLE TO COLLECT $2,500,000, 
OR 50%, OF THE ORIGINAL LOAN BALANCE. 
Summary of Taylor's Testimony: 
• The Auditors did not adequately identify potential fraud risks prior to 
beginning the audit. Expert witnesses testified that the Regal audit should 
have been identified as a "high risk" audit. 
• The audit staff members had 2 years or less of experience in the industry 
and no experience with Regal. 
• Only 65% of the audit workpapers had been reviewed by the audit partner 
before the audit opinion was issued. 
• Expert witnesses testified that there were other audit procedures that 
could have been used, which would probably have detected the fraudulent 
scheme. 
Summary of the Auditor's Responses: 
• The workpapers showed that the Auditors had identified Regal as a 
"moderately high risk" audit. The workpapers documented that the 
Auditors chose procedures based on this risk assessment. 
• The audit manager and partner each had 4 years experience in the 
industry. 
• The audit manager reviewed 90% of the audit workpapers and discussed 
all significant items with the audit partner before the audit opinion was 
issued. 
• The audit procedures used were appropriate for the audit based on the 
information available at the time. The Expert witnesses presented by 
Taylor had the benefit of hindsight to indicate other procedures that might 
have been better. 
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APPENDIX E - DEPENDENT VARIABLE MEASURES 
The following questions were used to check the manipulations of the independent 
variables: 
1. In my opinion, Taylor's loss was 
Very Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very High 
2. In my opinion, the Auditors' compliance with professional standards was 
Very Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very High 
The following questions were used to measure the dependent variable, audit quality 
perceptions: 
3. I would describe the quality of the audit provided by the Auditors as: 
Very Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very High 
4. In my opinion, the Auditors' responsibility for Taylor's loss is 
Very Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very High 
The following questions were used to measure the dependent variable,. damage awards: 
5. I believe the Auditors should pay damages that are 
Very Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very High 
6. Assuming that the minimum damages the Auditors could pay is $0 and the 
maximum is $15,000,000, I believe the Auditors should pay Taylor damages in 
the following range (PLACE AN "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE) 
$0 
between $1 and $2,500,000 
between $2,500,001 and $5,000,000 
between $5,000,001 and $7,500,000 
between $7,500,001 and $10,000,000 
between $10,000,001 and $12,500,000 
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